从建成到投运：绿氢项目卡在电解槽的负荷率上From Construction to Operation: Green Hydrogen Projects Stuck at the Load Factor of Electrolyzers

Ma Xingchuan

On the Gobi Desert in the northwest, wind turbines and photovoltaic panels have already been erected, and electrolyzers have been installed in the plant, but the real test only begins after the project starts production: whether the equipment can run continuously, at what load it can operate, and whether the cost per kilowatt-hour can be accounted for. The scale expansion of the green hydrogen industry is currently stuck in the final stretch from "construction completed" to "operation" — equipment commissioning is just the surface, behind which are three accounts: power supply, certification, and orders.

1.4 million tons, 270,000 tons, 1.13 million tons. These three numbers together form the most realistic profile of the current green hydrogen industry. The National Energy Administration's "China Hydrogen Development Report (2026)" shows that as of June 2026, China has built and is building renewable energy hydrogen production capacity exceeding 1.4 million tons per year, of which more than 270,000 tons per year have been completed and put into operation, and more than 1.13 million tons per year are under construction. The ratio of under-construction to completed is about 4.2 to 1, and the "reservoir" of capacity is not on the blueprint, but in the phase of putting into production.

Looking at the timeline, changes are happening faster. By the end of March 2026, the country will have more than 1 million tons per year of operational and under-construction renewable energy hydrogen production capacity, with over 250,000 tons per year already completed and operational, and over 900,000 tons per year under construction. In three months, the scale under construction increased by about 230,000 tons, while the operational scale only increased by about 20,000 tons. The speed of project commencement is clearly faster than the speed of project commissioning.

The regional distribution makes the contradictions clearer. Among the operational capacity, the Northeast region accounts for 45.7%, North China 30%, Northwest China 21.8%, and the remaining regions combined about 2.5%. In 2025, the Northeast and North China were the main growth areas, with new capacity exceeding 100,000 tons per year and 20,000 tons per year, respectively. The places with the best resources are often also the places with the lightest load.

The cost structure of green hydrogen determines the difficulty of this matter. In the cost of producing hydrogen through water electrolysis, electricity accounts for the largest share, followed by equipment depreciation. Green electricity is cheap in the Three North regions, but wind and solar output fluctuate. Electrolyzers need to operate continuously and stably, which requires either the grid to provide backup or storage to smooth the supply. Connecting to the grid means paying transmission and distribution fees and system charges when using grid electricity, while off-grid operation means relying on energy storage to flatten the curve; both approaches require adding costs on the balance sheet.

The equipment side of the accounting looks just as unappealing. Take the liquid hydrogen equipment company Guofu Hydrogen Energy as an example. Its mid-2026 performance shows that in the first half of the year, total revenue was about 104 million yuan, down about 4.5% year-on-year, and the loss attributable to the company's owners was about 120 million yuan, compared to a loss of about 89.2 million yuan in the same period the previous year. While equipment can be sold, profits have yet to catch up, which is a common situation across most segments of the green hydrogen chain.

Downstream demand is starting to open up, but it is still not enough to support a production capacity of 1.4 million tons. By 2025, nearly 8,000 fuel cell vehicles will be promoted nationwide, more than 10 hydrogen-based ships will be put into operation cumulatively, and over 30 models of hydrogen-powered drones will be released or tested. On the industrial side, the operational capacities of green ammonia and green methanol will reach 700,000 tons/year and 380,000 tons/year, respectively. Taken together, these numbers indicate that hydrogen consumption is still mainly driven by chemical and transportation demonstrations, and large-scale industrial substitution is still on the uphill climb.

The shortcomings in infrastructure are even more evident. As of June 2026, about 620 hydrogen refueling stations have been built nationwide, and over 350 kilometers of pure hydrogen pipelines have been put into operation. An annual production capacity of 1.4 million tons corresponds to a distribution network that is still under construction. With hydrogen’s short transport radius and high storage and transportation costs, without pipelines and sufficient liquid hydrogen production capacity, the output can only stay at the gates of industrial parks.

The electricity pricing mechanism is the first checkpoint. Document No. 650 in 2025 allows renewable energy to build its own lines to supply a single user directly. Document No. 688 in May 2026 expanded the scope to multiple users, clarifying that industrial parks, zero-carbon parks, and incremental distribution networks can connect to renewable energy nearby, and giving priority support for computing facilities and green hydrogen-ammonia-methanol to carry out direct green power connections. The policy provides a channel, but projects need to carefully calculate the proportion of self-use, transmission and distribution fees, and system reserve fees to avoid discovering at settlement time that the 'cheap green power' is actually not cheap.

The second checkpoint is certification. The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will enter the official levy stage from 2026, and export-oriented chemical, steel, and aluminum products will have to pay fees based on their carbon footprint. Green hydrogen and green ammonia must be sold at a premium and require traceable sources of green power, production time periods, and carbon emission accounting. The domestic green hydrogen certification system is still under construction, so from project commissioning to obtaining internationally recognized green certificates, there is still a way to go.

The third bottleneck lies in long-term contracts. Buyers of green ammonia and green methanol are concentrated in Japan, South Korea, and Europe, with long signing cycles and strong bargaining power. Without ten-year purchase and sales agreements, banks are reluctant to provide long-term loans for projects; without loans, projects can only rely on self-financing. The reason the yearly 10,000-ton green hydrogen purchase and sales intention agreement signed between Guofu Hydrogen Energy and Korea's Hylium is repeatedly mentioned in the industry is that it simultaneously addresses the questions of "who to sell to" and "where the money comes from."

Looking at the three bottlenecks together, the 1.4 million tons of under-construction capacity is not just hype; it corresponds to the production window concentrated in 2027-2028. The real questions that need answering are: where will the electricity come from when this capacity is put into operation, where will the hydrogen go, how will carbon accounting be done, and how will the money return? If even one of these four questions remains unanswered, the project will remain in a "built but not operational" state.

From 'completion' to 'commissioning,' what lies in between is not equipment debugging, but the commercial closed loop. From 2026 to 2027, the competitive focus of the green hydrogen industry will shift from 'who signs more projects' to 'whose vehicles are running at full capacity.' The operating rate will become a harder metric than production capacity.

The structure of project owners also affects the pace of commissioning. Investors in green hydrogen projects are mainly state-owned energy enterprises, local state-owned enterprises, and large chemical companies, while private companies are mostly concentrated in equipment and engineering sectors. Central enterprises are assessed based on installed capacity and investment completion rate, while local entities focus on output and tax revenue. Both sets of assessments point to 'starting the project,' whereas operating rates, load factors, and gross profit usually only come into view once the project enters the operational phase.

The delivery cycle of electrolyzers is another variable. A set of large alkaline electrolyzers typically requires several months from order to delivery, and PEM equipment takes even longer. Arrival of the equipment is just the first step; installation, commissioning, trial operation, and acceptance can each be delayed due to incomplete supporting conditions such as electricity, water, hydrogen storage, and grid connection. In the industry, it is not uncommon for half a year to a year to elapse between 'completion' and 'commissioning.'

The issuance and traceability of green certificates determine whether green hydrogen can be sold at a premium. International buyers require traceable green electricity sources, clear time matching, and carbon emission accounting methods. The connection between domestic green certificates and green hydrogen certification is still being improved. Even if a project is operational, without recognized proof of its green attributes, the product can only be sold as ordinary hydrogen.

From an investment rhythm perspective, the construction scale in the second quarter of 2026 increased by about 230,000 tons compared to the end of the first quarter, an increment equivalent to the total annual operation volume of 2025. Project reserves are sufficient; the problem lies in supporting facilities. A green hydrogen project must simultaneously have power sources, land, water supply, hydrogen storage and transportation conditions, and downstream agreements; missing any one element can hold up the entire construction period.

The enthusiasm of local investment promotion is also worth being cautious about. Some cities and counties treat green hydrogen projects as promotional tools, making commitments on land and electricity prices when signing agreements, only to discover delays in grid access and difficulty in obtaining approvals. Projects may nominally start construction, but the actual progress is slow, ultimately reflecting a large under-construction scale but a small operational scale. This kind of 'paper start' is one reason for the low production rate.

From the perspective of industry maturity, green hydrogen is still in the transition period from demonstration to commercialization. The reliability of equipment, the system integration capability, and operational experience all need to be developed project by project. Low production rates are not entirely bad; they remind the industry that before expanding scale, the first batch of projects should be run at full capacity to generate costs and data.

For electrolyzer companies, another aspect of these numbers is the order structure. The 1.13 million tons of capacity under construction correspond to equipment deliveries for more than a year; the 270,000 tons in operation correspond to the market for operation, maintenance, spare parts, and consumables. Equipment manufacturers hope that the scale under construction continues to expand, while operators hope that the scale in operation ramps up as quickly as possible. These two demands do not always align.

[Information and data in the text are sourced from: National Energy Administration, China Hydrogen Development Report (2026); transcript of the National Energy Administration press conference on April 27, 2026; Guofu Hydrogen Energy 2026 mid-year performance public disclosure; National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration Document No. 688 (2026); publicly available industry reports]

【Research Supporting Institutions: 'China Industry News' Energy and Dual-Carbon Research Center | China Energy Industry Development Network】

This article's reference data sources: publicly available industry reports, National Energy Administration 'China Hydrogen Energy Development Report (2026)', transcript of the National Energy Administration press conference on April 27, 2026, National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration Document [2026] No. 688 on energy development, Guofu Hydrogen Energy 2026 mid-year performance